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STATE TAXATION OF FEDERAL
INSTRUMENTALITIES: APPLICATION TO
FEDERAL LOAN & EQUITY PROGRAMS
I. Introduction
Although the Constitution does not expressly provide for inter-
governmental immunities from taxation,1 the Supreme Court has
implied such a doctrine relying on the Supremacy Clause.' The
Court has construed the Supremacy Clause to mean that a state
may not tax the federal government or any of its instrumentali-
ties. This Note discusses the attempts by states to tax entities
which have a distinguishing connection to the federal government.
Two competing interests are at stake. First, from the perspective
of the federal government, such taxation by a state involves the
power to destroy4 or at least the power to substantially interfere
with the functions of federal law and thus subvert the operation of
1. State taxation of imports and exports was expressly prohibited in U.S. CONST. art. I, §
10, cl. 2, which provides that: "No state shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for exe-
cuting its inspection Laws .. "
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
3. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In Collector v. Day, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 113 (1870), the Court held that Congress may not impose a tax upon the salary of
a judicial officer of a state. The Court stated: "[i]f the means and instrumentalities em-
ployed by [the federal] government to carry into operation the powers granted to it are,
necessarily, and, for the sake of self-preservation, exempt from taxation by the States, why
are not those of the States depending upon their reserve powers, for like reasons, equally
exempt from Federal taxation?" Id. at 127. Subsequently, state immunity from federal taxa-
tion was restricted to governmental as oppossed to proprietary activities of the state.
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938). In New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572
(1946), the federal government sought to tax a mineral water bottling plant operation of the
state. The Court held such a tax would be valid if it was non-discriminatory and was not
levied on those activities which were uniquely characteristic of a government. In a concur-
ring opinion by Chief Justice Stone, the rest of the majority also rejected the government-
proprietary test but noted that there might be a non-discriminatory tax which "would nev-
ertheless impair the sovereign status of the State. . . ." Id. at 587. See McCormack, Inter-
governmental Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 51 N.C.,L. Rav. 485.(1973)...
4. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427, 431.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
the Supremacy Clause. Second, because the taxing power is an es-
sential instrument of every sovereign government, the judicial de-
nial of a state's right to exercise this power would deprive it of a
much needed source of revenue. This Note is specifically concerned
with how these interests relate to state taxation of recipients of
federal loan and equity financing and argues that in this particular
area the judicial is not the proper forum for weighing these com-
plex policy issues because Congress is in a better position to decide
this question. Section II of this Note traces the constitutional his-
tory of the doctrine of federal immunity.5 Section III sets out the
various tests which have been used to determine when a private
entity may be considered a federal instrumentality for purposes of
immunity from state taxation. Section IV discusses the doctrine as
it presently exists in relation to loan and equity finance programs
of the federal government. Section V suggests that Congress should
take a more active role in determining which private entities
should be granted instrumentality status.
II. Constitutional Background
A. McCulloch v. Maryland
In the landmark decision of McCulloch v. Maryland,6 Maryland
sought to impose a tax on the bank notes issued by the Bank of
the United States.7 The taxing statute required either that the
bank print its notes on stamped paper sold by the state or pay an
annual lump sum to the state in lieu of purchasing the paper.8
Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, held that
the states could not tax or otherwise interfere with a federal in-
strumentality, 9 stating "the states have no power, by taxation or
otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the
operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry
5. See generally Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARv.
L. REV. 633 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Waning of Tax Immunities]; Powell, The Remnant
of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1945) [hereinafter cited as
Remnant of Tax Immunity].
6. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
7. The tax was discriminatory in that it was levied only upon banks operating within
Maryland without the state's authority. The Bank of the United States was the only bank in
this category. Id. at 320.
8. Id. at 321.
9. Id. at 328-31.
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into execution the powers vested in the general government."' 10
The Court reasoned that, although the power to tax is an essen-
tial incident of sovereignty," a state cannot exercise this power
over those entities to which its sovereignty does not extend,
namely, the federal government. 2 Because the power to tax neces-
sarily involves the power to destroy," to permit a state to tax a
federal instrumentality would result in the destruction by the state
of an entity which it did not create.' 4
It was the vulnerability of the federal government to states'
abuse of the taxing power which compelled the Court to erect a per
se rule against such taxation. Chief Justice Marshall stated that
the structure of the government itself provides the only protection
against abuse.'5 The Court reasoned that a state's own citizens, un-
like the federal government, were protected from "erroneous and
oppressive taxation"' 6 by representation in the state's legislature.
The federal government, lacking representation in the state, was
left without security from abuse by a state. 7 Thus, the federal gov-
ernment was in need of the protection of a per se rule" which pro-
scribed taxation of federal instrumentalities by a state."9
10. Id. at 336.
11. "[T]he power of taxation is one of vital importance; that it is retained by the states;
that it is not abridged by the grant of a similar power to the government of the Union; that
it is to be concurrently exercised by the two governments-are truths which have never
been denied." Id. at 425.
12. "The sovereignty of a state extends to every thing which exists by its own authority,
or is introduced by its permission; but does it extend to those means which are employed by
congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the people of the United
States? We think it demonstrable, that it does not." Id. at 429.
13. Id. at 427, 431.
14. "[W]hen a state taxes the operations of the government of the United States, it acts
upon institutions created, not by their own constituents, but by people over whom they
claim no control. It acts upon the measures of a government created by others as well as
themselves for the benefit of others in common with themselves." Id. at 435.
15. Id. at 428-29.
16. Id. at 428.
17. "The people of a state, therefore, give to their government a right of taxing them-
sieves and their property . . . resting confidently on the interests of the legislator, and on
the influence of the constituent over their representative, to guard them against its abuse."
Id. at 428.
18. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-28 at 392.
19. The Court stated: "In the legislature of the Union alone, are all represented. The
legislature of the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the people with the power of
controlling measures which concern all, in the confidence that it will not be abused." Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 431. Maryland argued that a rule of reason
1981] 1091
1092 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IX
McCulloch established the principle that, absent affirmative
Congressional consent to the contrary,20 the United States Govern-
ment is immune from state taxation.2 The fact that a federal in-
strumentality is involved rather than the government itself does
not alter the application of this doctrine.2 2 The Court did limit its
holding, however, to permit a state to tax certain property of a
federal entity. For example, Maryland could continue to tax the
should apply and that only those taxes which were exercised in an unreasonable and oppres-
sive manner should be prohibited. Id. at 427. Justice Marshall, however, recognized the diffi-
culty federal courts would have deciding whether the tax was reasonable and thus estab-
lished an absolute immunity from state taxation of federal instrumentalities. The Court
stated: "We are not driven to the perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the judicial department,
what degree of taxation is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount [sic] to the
abuse of the power." Id. at 430. The per se rule adopted by McCulloch has nevertheless
resulted in the deep involvement of the federal courts in the determination of the validity of
such state tax statutes. The relatively simple test that a state tax of a federal instrumental-
ity is valid so long as it does not discriminate against the federal government was rejected.
See Weston v. Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829) (Johnson, J., dissenting); cf. First
Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 350 (1968) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) ("One could, and perhaps should, read McCulloch . . . simply for the principle that
the Constitution prohibits a State from taxing discriminatorily a federally established
instrumentality.").
The McCulloch Court held that any tax imposed by a state on the operations of the
Union was itself an abuse "because it [was] the usurpation of a power which the people of a
single state cannot give." Id. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 430. This rationale was followed in Wes-
ton v. Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829) (a property tax assesed on government bonds).
20. The Court found that Congress had the power to create the bank. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
at 400-24. From this proposition it follows that Congress, by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause, may determine which entities are to be immune from state taxation. "The legisla-
ture of the Union alone . . . can be trusted by the people with the power of controlling
measures which concern all, in the confidence that it will not be abused." Id. at 431. See
Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 122 (1954); Oklahoma v. Barnsdall Refineries,
Inc., 296 U.S. 521, 525-26 (1936); Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U.S. 575, 581
(1928); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664, 668 (1899); Mercantile Bank v.
New York, 121 U.S. 138 (1887); People v. Weaver, 100 U.S. 539, 543 (1879).
21. This doctrine has been consistently followed. See, e.g., United States v. Tax
Comm'n, 421 U.S. 599 (1975); United States v. Little Lake Misereland Co., 412 U.S. 580,
606-08 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); United States v. Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944);
Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943); Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n., 318 U.S.
261 (1943).
22. See Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. County of San Diego, 362 U.S. 628 (1960) (holding the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation immune from state taxation because it was a federal
instrumentality notwithstanding an agreement with a private lessee whereby the lessee
would pay all such taxes); First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341, 347 (1926) (holding
instrumentalities or "agencies of the United States created under its laws to promote its
fiscal policies . . .cannot be taxed under state authority except as Congress consents and
then only in conformity with the restrictions attached to its consent").
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real property owned by the bank and to tax the interest which citi-
zens of Maryland received from the bank on their depositsa' The
Court carved out this exception reasoning that the state should not
be deprived of those resources which were "originally possessed"
by it.' 4
This distinction between a tax on the means or operations of the
federal government and a tax on its property became important for
private entities who claimed immunity.28 Real property owned by
the federal government itself, however, was later held to be im-
mune from state taxation.'
B. The Legal Incidence Doctrine
In the years following the Supreme Court's decision in McCul-
loch v. Maryland, the doctrine of federal immunity from state tax-
ation experienced its greatest expansion.27 During this period, fed-
eral courts applied the per se rule whenever there was a showing
that the state tax would place an economic burden s on the federal
government. As a result, the Court employed this doctrine to pro-
hibit, for example, state taxes on a federal officer's salary," sales
made to the United States,80 royalties from United States' pat-
23. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436. This distinction between a tax on federal property and a
tax on the operations of the federal government was followed in Thompson v. Pacific R.R.,
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 579, 580 (1869).
24. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436.
25. See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) (In holding a state tax on a
government contractor valid, the Court stated that no tax can be laid upon the operations of
a federal instrumentality which exists for private gain; but its local property is subject to
non-discriminating state taxation); cf., Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341 (1923)
(The Court held that a state could not tax the property of a liquidating federal instrumen-
tality. Where the sole purpose of the creation and use of the instrumentality was to perform
a government function.).
26. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886).
27. See Waning of Tax Immunities, supra note 5; Remnant of Tax Immunities, supra
note 5.
28. See United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 460 (1977) (The Court noted
that during this period state taxes on federal government contractors would be invalidated
"whenever the effect of the tax was or might be to increase the cost to the Federal Govern-
ment of performing its functions.").
29. Dobbins v. Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842) (implicitly overruled by Graves
v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 481 (1939)).
30. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1828), overruled, Ala-
bama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941). See also Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393
(1936).
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ents,31 and income of lessees of Indian lands.2
The Supreme Court, however, refined the economic burden test
in 1937 in James v. Dravo Contracting Co.as In Dravo, West Vir-
ginia wished to impose a gross receipts tax on the income received
by a construction company under contract with the federal govern-
ment to build locks and dams. 4 Under the rules developed in the
decisions prior to Dravo,85 such a tax would have been unconstitu-
tional because the contractor could have shifted the ultimate bur-
den to the government. The Dravo Court redefined the economic
burden test and held that where no direct burden is laid upon the
federal government, the states could impose a nondiscriminatory
tax which is collected from government contractors." The fact that
imposition of the tax would increase the cost of government opera-
tions did not invalidate the tax.
Of particular importance to private entities claiming immunity
from state taxation, the Court further noted that the "mode of
constitution" of such entities could not be disregarded in deciding
the question of tax exemption."5 The majority stated that
31. Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142 (1928), overruled, Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S.
123, 131 (1932).
32. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922), overruled, Helvering v. Mountain Pro'
ducers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 387 (1938); Burnet v. Colorado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393
(1932), overruled, Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 387 (1938).
33. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
34. Id. at 137.
35. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
36. 302 U.S. at 149-50.
37. Id. at 160. The majority in Dravo recognized the distinction made in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436, between a tax on a federal instrumentality's property
and a tax on its operations. Under the rule established in McCulloch, the property used by
the contractor in performing its services for the federal government was not immune from
taxation by the state. The Dravo Court found that a tax on the contractor's property was
"closely analogous" to a tax on the income derived from the use of that property and thus a
tax on such income was also constitutional. 302 U.S. at 153. The Court stated: "His [a con-
tractor's] earnings flow from his work; his property is employed in securing them. In both
cases, the taxes increase the cost of the work and diminish his profits." Id. The Court reaf-
firmed that a tax on property was proper and, from that proposition, established the princi-
ple that a tax on the income produced from the use of that property was also constitutional.
Although payment by the contractor of both a property tax and an income tax resulted in
an economic burden on the federal government because the cost of the tax would probably
be shifted to the government, the Dravo Court found the government suffered no direct
burden because the taxing statute itself did not impose the tax directly on the government
or its contractor.
38. 302 U.S. at 157.
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it was obvious that an agency might be of such a character or so intimately
connected with the exercise of a power or the performance of a duty by the
one government 'that any taxation of it by the other would be such a direct
interference with the functions of government itself as to be plainly beyond
the taxing power.
39
By narrowing the economic burden test to prohibit state taxa-
tion only in cases where there was a direct burden on the federal
government and by permitting state taxation of income derived
from property used in performing services for the federal govern-
ment, Dravo adjusted the balance of federal and state interests
which had fallen so heavily in prior years in favor of immunizing
the national government from state taxation.'0 The Court sought a
more practical construction in an effort to balance competing pol-
icy interests and to limit interference with the sovereign functions
of both the state and federal governments."I Justice Roberts, dissenting in Dravo, concluded that "the United
States may, in its discretion, erect corporations for private gain
and employ them as its instrumentalities. No tax can be laid upon
their franchises or operations, but their local property is subject to
non-discriminating state taxation." Justice Roberts further
stated, however, that the bestowal of benefits or rights by federal
law upon an individual or corporation does not, by itself, call for
the application of the federal immunity doctrine."'
39. Id. (quoting Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523-24 (1926)).
40. The Court also cited language from Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216, 225 (1931). In
Willcuts, the Court held that income received by owners upon the sale of government bonds
was not immune from state taxation. The Willcuts Court stated:
The power to tax is no less essential than the power to borrow money, and in preserv-
ing the latter, it is not necessary to cripple the former by extending the constitutional
exemption from taxation to those subjects which fall within the general application of
non-discriminatory laws, and where no direct burden is laid upon the governmental
instrumentality, and there is only a remote, if any influence upon the exercise of the
functions of government.
302 U.S. at 150.
41. The Court illustrated this concern stating that the principles employed in achieving
this delicate balance required the observance of "close distinctions" to insure "the essential
freedom of government in performing its functions, without unduly limiting the taxing
power which is equally essential to both Nation and State under our dual system." Id.
42. 'Id. at 163 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
43. According to Justice Roberts, a state tax upon such an entity is void if it falls upon
an operation in which the government has an interest, or is an excise or privilege tax upon
the contractor's operations. Id. at 163-64.
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Dravo supports the proposition that federal sovereignty is not
violated by a state tax which is neither discriminatory nor is laid
directly upon the federal government." The Supreme Court, in
later government contractor cases, expanded upon and further il-
lustrated this notion."
In Alabama v. King & Boozer," the defendant furnished lumber
to cost-plus-fixed-fee contractors who. were constructing an army
camp for the government. 47 Alabama sought to impose a two per-
cent sales tax on the sale of the lumber from the defendant to the
government contractors. 48 The defendant argued that it did not
have to collect the tax from the contractors because it would be a
violation of the federal immunity doctrine. 9
The Supreme Court rejected an economic impact test 50 and up-
held the Alabama statute stating that the legal incidence of the tax
did not fall on a federal instrumentality. The Court found that the
legal incidence did not fall on the government because it was not
the purchaser who was legally obligated to pay the tax under the
statute."' Rather, the contractor was obligated to pay the tax under
the statute. Only where the government itself is liable for payment
44. In sustaining a non-discriminatory state tax on the income of federal employees, the
Court again rejected the economic burden test in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306
U.S. 466 (1939) (overruling Dobbins v. Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842)). The
Graves Court stated that the tax would be invalid only if "the economic burden of the tax is
in some way passed on so as to impose a burden on the national government tantamount to
an interference by one government with the other in the performance of its function." 306
U.S. at 481.
45. See Kern-Limerick, Inc., v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954); Alabama v. King &
Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941). See also Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. at 485-86
(1939); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 420-22 (1938); Helvering v. Mountain Producers
Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926).
46. 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
47. Id. at 6.
48. Id. at 7.
49. In its contract with the contractors, in addition to the payment of a fixed fee, the
government promised to reimburse the contractors for their expenses including all state and
local taxes. Id. at 10. Thus, presumably under the economic burden test the tax was void as
unconstitutional.
50. Even the government wished to abandon the economic burden test. In its brief in
King & Boozer, the government characterized such a test as "illusory and incapable of con-
sistent application." United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473 n.4 (1958).
51. 314 U.S. at 7 ("the tax is laid on the seller, who is denominated the 'taxpayer'. .. it
is made the duty of the seller 'to add to the sales price and collect from the purchaser the
amount due by the taxpayer on account of said tax.' ") Id. (citations omitted).
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of the tax will the tax be struck down.
The Court also closely construed the terms of the contract and
found that the incidence of the tax fell on the contractor even
though the government maintained extensive control52 over the
contractor and title to the purchased lumber ultimately vested in
the United States."
Thus, the legal incidence doctrine as employed in Alabama v.
King & Boozer"' was an ad hoc formula5 5 under which the Su-
preme Court analyzed the taxing statute to determine who was le-
gally obligated to pay the tax.5 In contrast to its holding in King
52. The Court examined the amount of control that the federal government exercised
over the private entity to determine whether there existed an agency relationship. The
Court held that this right to control the contractors did not give to the contractors the
status of agents. Id. at 13. See United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 41 (1964) (holding that
Union Carbide was not a federal instrumentality despite extensive entanglement with the
Atomic Energy Commission); United States v. Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486 (1958) (holding
that a private corporation was not a federal instrumentality because it could not properly be
called a servant of the United States in agency terms). Control is an essential element in an
agency or master-servant relationship. "Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from
the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf
and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." (emphasis added) RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). A servant is defined in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220 (1958) as "a person employed to perform service in the affairs of another and
who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the
other's control or right to control." (emphasis added). See F. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY
§§ 413-416 (4th ed. 1952). But see United States v. New Mexico, 624 F.2d 111 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-702), where the court stated
that "[a]lthough there is language in these Supreme Court opinions suggesting that the re-
sults turn on traditional agency principles . . . it seems evident that the Court is more con-
cerned with preserving the delicate financial balance between our co-existing sovereignties
than with rigid adherence to agency law terminology." See also United States v. Forst, 442
F. Supp. 920 (W.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 569 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1978).
53. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. at 13-14. The Court stated: "[tihe asserted right
of the one [sovereign] to be free of taxation by the other does not spell immunity from
paying the added costs, attributable to the taxation of [its contractors]." Id. at 9.
54. 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
55. Id. at 14. In the companion case of Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941), the
Court used the same test in holding valid the imposition of a state use tax on a government
contractor. The Court in Curry, as well as in King & Boozer, recognized that the tax af-
fected the government only through operation of the contract. "If the state law lays the tax
upon [the contractors] rather than the [government] with whom they enter into a cost-plus
contract like the present one, then it affects the Government . . . only as the economic
burden is shifted to it through operation of the contact." Id. at 18.
56. The fact that "Congress ha[d] declined to pass legislation immunizing from state
taxation contractors -under 'cost-plus' contracts for the construction of governmental
projects," 314 U.S. at 8, may have been an important factor in the Court's decision.
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& Boozer, the Court in Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock held a sim-
ilar tax to be unconstitutional."
In Kern-Limerick, Arkansas wished to impose a two percent
gross receipts tax on income derived from the sale of tractors by
Kern-Limerick to contractors building a naval ammunition depot.
The Supreme Court held that pursuant to the terms of the con-
tract between the Navy and the private contractor, the contractor
was the purchasing agent of the government and therefore the "le-
gal incidence" of the tax fell upon the United States.", Justice
Reed, writing for the majority, stated that the doctrine of federal
immunity from state taxation was so embedded in constitutional
history that the Court could not subject the government to such
taxation without a clear congressional mandate.' 9 Absent a waiver
of federal immunity by Congress" "the form of contracts. . . may
determine the effect of state taxation on federal agencies." 1
Kern-Limerick condoned the use of contract terms to allow the
federal government to protect its instrumentalities from state taxa-
tion. Thus, in addition to analyzing the taxing statute to discover
the "legal incidence" of a state tax, as prescribed in King &
Boozer, the Kern-Limerick Court found it necessary to determine
if the government had agreed to contract terms which would result
in the conferral of immunity to the private entity.62
The principles enunciated in Kern-Limerick are in derrogation
of the principles underlying the federal immunity doctrine. The
constitutional history of the federal immunity doctrine reveals a
search for an equitable and efficient formula which would protect
57. 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
58. Id. at 122-23.
59. Id. at 122.
60. Earlier in the opinion the Court also noted the "attention Congress has given in
recent years to a proper adjustment of tax liabilities between the federal and state sover-
eignties." Id. at 116.
61. Id. at 122-23.
62. In his dissent, Justice Douglas criticized this formula because it allowed "any govern-
ment functionary to draw the constitutional line by changing a few words in a contract." Id.
at 126 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court later adopted this criticism in cases
where state taxes were imposed upon private entities using federal property. In United
States v. Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958), the Court states that "[c]onstitutional immunity
from state taxation does not rest on such insubstantial formalities as whether the party
using government property is formally designated a 'lessee.' Otherwise immunity could be
conferred by a simple stroke of the draftman's pen." Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
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the sovereign interests of both state and federal governments. To
allow federal officials to arbitrarily designate private entities as
tax-exempt by virtue of a contract would be to sweep aside this
history and ignore the compelling policy interests of the state."
III. When is a Private Entity Considered a Federal
Instrumentality
If the legal incidence of a state tax does not fall directly on the
government but rather falls on a private entity which for all in-
tents and purposes is controlled by the federal government, one
must then consider whether this entity, operating for a profit,"4
may be considered a federal instrumentality for purposes of tax
immunity.6
63. See United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958) (separate opinion of Frankfurter,J.):
A principle with the uninterrupted historic longevity attributable to the immunity of
government property from state taxation has a momentum of authority that reflects,
if not a detailed exposition of considerations of policy demanded by our federal sys-
tem, certainly a deep instinct that there are such considerations, and that the distinc-
tion between a tax on government property and a tax on a third person for the privi-
lege of using such property is not an 'empty formalism.'" The distinction embodies a
considered judgment as to the minimum safeguard necessary for the National Gov-
ernment to carry on its essential functions without hinderance from the exercise of
power by another sovereign within the same territory. That in a particular case there
may in fact be no conflict in the exercise of the two governmental powers is not to the
point. It is in avoiding the potentialities of friction and furthering the smooth opera-
tion of complicated governmental machinery that the constitutional doctrine of im-
munity finds its explanation and justification.
Id. at 503-04.
64. But see United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1972) (holding that a state
may tax property owned by the United States which is being used by a private citizen).
Three companion decisions upheld a Michigan statute that provided that whenever tax-
exempt property is leased or otherwise made available to a business user, such user is taxa-
ble as though he were the owner. United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958); United
States v. Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958); United States v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489
(1958).
65. See Agricultural Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In Agricultural Bank, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that national
banks were not immune from taxes as federal instrumentalities because they received remu-
neration for performance of a federal function. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that
the grant of tax immunity status by Congress mooted the issue. Justice Marshall's dissent,
however, provides a useful overview of the various formulations which have been used to
determine whether an institution or an individual is immune. Id. at 348-63 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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In United States v. Boyd," the Court held that a Tennessee use
tax imposed on government property used by contractors in the
performance of their contractual duty was constitutional. In Boyd,
Union Carbide had a contract with the Atomic Energy Commission
("AEC") to maintain an atomic plant owned by the federal govern-
ment.6 7 Although under the contract Union Carbide's efforts were
closely tied to the efforts of the AEC, the Court found that Union
Carbide obtained financial advantages of its own from the use of
the plant." Thus, because of its own profit and gain from the use
of the property, Union Carbide was not found to be an instrumen-
talitye9 of the federal government immune from state taxation. 0
In Clallam County v. United States71 the United States Spruce
66. 378 U.S. 39 (1964).
67. Id. at 41.
68. Id. at 43. See also United States v. New Mexico, 624 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-702) (private corporations having man-
agement contracts with the Energy Research and Development Administration were subject
to state's gross receipts tax); United States v. Forst, 442 F. Supp. 920 (W.D. Va. 1977), affld
per curiam, 569 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding a government contractor liable for a state
tax, the court noted that title to purchased items and control over the contractor is not
important. What is important is whose credit is bound.) Id. at 923-24.
69. In Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952), the Court held that, under
the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 86-585, 60 Stat. 755 ch. 724 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1809(b) (1976)), as amended by Act of Aug. 30, 1954, 68 Stat. 755 ch. 1073, which
exempted the AEC from state taxation, Tennessee was barred from imposing a use tax on
property used by private entities in fulfilling their contracts with the AEC. However, in the
Act of Aug. 13, 1953, Pub. L. No. 88-262, 67 Stat. 575 ch. 432, Congress repealed this exemp-
tion. The Atomic Energy Act 1946, 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (L) (1976), includes in its definition of
government agencies those independent establishments or corporations wholly or partly
owned by the government.
70. See United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. at 44-48. The Supreme Court recognized in
United States v. Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944) that "[tihe distinction between taxation of
private interests and taxation of governmental interests, although sometimes difficult to de-
fine, is fundamental in application of the immunity doctrine as developed in this country."
Id. at 186. In Allegheny, a state sought to tax the value of machinery owned by the United
States while it was being used by a government contractor. The Court held the tax to be an
invalid tax on the government's property. The Court stated: "[the corporation] has some
legal and beneficial interest in this property .... Whether such a right of possession and
use. . . could be taxed by appropriate proceedings we do not decide." Id. But see L. TRIBE,
supra note 18, at § 6-29 at 399 n.32, suggesting that Allegheny must now be regarded either
as overruled by the Michigan property cases, United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958);
United States v. Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958); United States v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S.
489 (1958), or limited to the situation in which federal property is subject to a lien in event
of non-payment of taxes by the private entity. See United States v. County of Fresno, 429
U.S. 452 (1977).
71. 263 U.S. 341 (1923).
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Production Corporation was established by the federal government
in order to manufacture airplanes for government use during
World War 1.72 The corporation was closely connected with the
federal government, as illustrated by the fact that the United
States owned all but seven shares of the corporation's stock.73 In
addition, all the bonds issued by the corporation were held by the
federal government. 4 The State of Washington sought to tax land
and property conveyed by the United States to the company.75
The Court held that the state could not tax the property of a
corporation which, though formed under state laws was established
and operated by the United States purely as an instrument of
war.7  The Court was influenced by the fact that the federal gov-
ernment furnished the property used by the corporation and
owned most of its stock and bonds in concluding that the corpora-
tion was a federal instrumentality." The Court noted that while
taxation of property is generally distinguished from taxation of op-
erations, 78 Clallam was an exception 7  because, not only was the
instrumentality created by the government, but all its property
was acquired and used for the sole purpose of performing a federal
function.80 The Court stated that "[t]his is not like the case of a
72. Id. at 343.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 343-44.
76. Id. at 344-45.
77. Clallam County is of particular significance when a corporation which has partici-
pated in a federal loan or equity financing program seeks immunity from state taxation. See
notes 111-37 infra and accompanying text.
78. 263 U.S. at 344.
79. See New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U.S. 547 (1928). In New Brunswick the
Supreme Court held that land acquired by the United States Housing Corporation and di-
rected to be sold with reservation of a first lien for unpaid purchase money was not subject
to state taxation because the Corporation held title as an instrumentality of the federal
government. After the purchasers had made payments entitling them to receive deeds to the
lots, however, the Corporation ceased to hold title solely for the federal government. The
lots were then taxable. Id. at 555. In United States v. Milwaukee, 140 F.2d 286 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 322 U.S. 735 (1944), the Court held, following New Brunswick, that property
acquired by the Federal Public Housing Authority was exempt from state taxation.
80. 263 U.S. at 345. National banks have always had a significant role in the perform-
ance of essential federal functions. Beginning with McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819), these banks have traditionally been considered federal instrumentalities
and, as such, immune from federal taxation. See Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro, 173
U.S. 664 (1899); Osborn v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). As the roles of both
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corporation having its own purposes as well as those of the United
States and interested in profit on its own account."8' The Court
declined to consider whether the mere ownership by the federal
government of all the assets of the corporation taken by itself
would be enough to find the corporation immune from state taxa-
tion.8s The Court implied, however, that where the corporation was
created solely to perform a federal function it would be exempt
from state taxation.
In 1941, the Supreme Court, in Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck
Lumber Co.,88 held that because the land bank was organized to
effectuate the specific government program of extending credit on
liberal terms to farm borrowers, it was an instrumentality of the
United States despite the fact that the land bank possessed many
of the characteristics of a private business corporation."' In 1942,
the federal government and national banks have evolved, however, the status of national
banks as federal instrumentalities has been increasingly criticized. In NRLB v. Bank of
America, 130 F.2d 624 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 792 (1942) the Ninth Circuit held
that the bank was not an instrumentality of the government. Id. at 626-27. The bank was
found to be a privately owned and managed corporation operated in the interest of the
stockholders. The majority stated that
[tihe United States did not create it, but has merely enabled it to be created. . . .It
is true . . . that national banks may at times be called upon as aids in carrying out
the fiscal policies of the government, but their activities in these respects are occa-
sional and incidental to the primary purpose of the individuals who organize them.
Id. at 627. In Agricultural Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968), the Supreme Court
reversed a ruling by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that national banks were
not immune from state taxation. The Court, however, based its reversal not upon the asser-
tion that national banks are federal instrumentalities, but upon the fact that the state tax-
ing statute was not among the four specified methods of taxation permitted by Congress. 12
U.S.C. § 548 (1969). See District of Columbia Nat'l Bank v. District of Columbia, 348 F.2d
808 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that § 548 was necessary to permit state legislatures to tax
national banks). Justice Marshall, dissenting in Agricultural Bank, insisted that a national
bank cannot be considered immune from state taxation under any of the various rubrics
previously employed by the Court to determine if an entity is a federal instrumentality.
Justice Marshall stated: "[a national bank] is a privately owned corporation existing for the
private profit of its shareholders. It performs no significant federal governmental function
that is not performed equally by state-chartered banks. Government officials do not run its
day-to-day operations nor does the Government have any ownership interest in a national
bank." 392 U.S. at 354 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. at 345.
82. Id.
83. 314 U.S. 95 (1941).
84. Id. at 101-02. The Supreme Court affirmed that the federal land banks were instru-
mentalities, see Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229 (1935); Smith v. Kansas City
Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). The Court in Bismark also recognized that "Con-
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the Court held in Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson"" that post ex-
changes on military bases were instrumentalities of the federal'
government for purposes of tax immunity. In reaching its decision,
a unanimous Court found that the exchanges were "arms of the
Government deemed by it essential for the performance of govern-
mental functions."86 The Court noted that the exchanges were "in-
tegral parts" of the War Department and thus partook of the De-
partment's immunity under the Constitution. s7
In United States v. Muskegon," one of the Michigan property
cases," the Supreme Court considered the fact that the corpora-
tion was using federal property in connection with its own com-
mercial activities, as dispositive in concluding that the corporation
was subject to a state tax. Under the taxing statute, Michigan as-
sessed the value of work in process in the possession of a subcon-
tractor while he was working under a government contract. The
United States held legal title under the terms of the subcontract to
the property assessed.
Although dictum in Muskegon indicated that the decision might
have been different had the federal government exercised greater
control over the subcontractor,90 the majority held that, in fact, the
gress has authority to prescribe tax immunity for activities connected with, or in further-
ance of lending functions of federal credit agencies." 314 U.S. at 103. The Court stated
[t]he argument that the lending functions of the federal land banks are proprietary
rather than governmental misconceives the nature of the federal government with
respect to every function which it performs. The federal government is one of dele-
gated powers, and from that it necessarily follows that any constitutional exercise of
its delegated powers is governmental. . . . It also follows that, when Congress consti-
tutionally creates a corporation through which the federal government lawfully acts,
the activities of such corporation are governmental.
Id. at 102 (citations omitted). See Federal Land Bank v. Kiowa County, 368 U.S. 146, 150
(1961); Pittman v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21, 32 (1939); Graves v. New York ex
rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. at 477.
85. 316 U.S. 481 (1942).
86. Id. at 485.
87. Id. The Court also considered the control government officials maintained over the
operation of the exchanges. For example, the commanding officer had complete authority to
establish and maintain the exchange. He designated a post exchange officer to manage its
affairs. This officer and the commanding officers of various company units comprised a
council which supervised exchange activities. Id. at 484.
88. 355 U.S. 484 (1958).
89. See United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958); United States v. Muskegon, 355
U.S. 484 (1958); United States v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
90. United States v. Muskegon, 355 U.S. at 486.
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subcontractor "was not so assimilated by the Government as to
become one of its constituent parts. It was free within broad limits
to use the property as it thought advantageous and convenient in
performing its contracts and maximizing its profits from them.""
The New York Court of Appeals in Liberty National Bank &
Trust Co. v. Buscaglia," held that a national bank was not entitled
to a constitutionally implied immunity from state taxation as a
federal instrumentality. The court distinguished prior case law" by
finding that contemporary national banks do not perform services
for the federal government as essential as those rendered by the
banks of the 1800's.94 The court stated that privately owned and
operated businesses which perform services for the federal govern-
ment are not per se immune from a state tax which does not inter-
fere with the performance of their service to the government."
The Red Cross in Department of Employment v. United
States, 6 was held to be an instrumentality of the United States.
The Court stated that there was "no simple test" for ascertaining
whether an institution is "so closely related to governmental activ-
ity as to become . . . [an] instrumentality." ' Sighificant factors
considered in its decision were that the Red Cross was chartered
by Congress, its principal officers were appointed by the President,
it received substantial financial aid from the federal government
and it performed functions indispensable to the workings of the
government." The Red Cross was deemed to be an arm of the gov-
ernment and thus immune from state taxation.99
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. 21 N.Y.2d 357, 235 N.E.2d 101, 288 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S.
929 (1968), reargument, 23 N.Y.S.2d 933, 246 N.E.2d 361, 298 N.Y.S.2d 513, cert. denied,
396 U.S. 941 (1969).
93. See note 80 supra.
94. 21 N.Y.2d at 360-62, 370, 235 N.E.2d at 102-04, 108, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 34-37, 43.
95. Id. at 366, 235 N.E.2d at 106, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 40. In another instance, a state court
held that governmental immunity from taxation does not extend to corporations or individ-
uals merely because their activities are useful to the federal government. Boeing Co. v.
Omdahl, 169 N.W.2d 696 (N.D. 1969).
96. 385 U.S. 355 (1966).
97. Id. at 358-59.
98. Id. at 359.
99. Id. at 359-60. See also Small Business Admin. v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446 (1960). The
SBA was deemed to be an integral part of the government not a separate legal entity. The
Court distinguished Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549
(1922), where the Court refused to treat the corporation as an agent of the United States,
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In summary, although there is no single standard with which to
determine when a private entity is a federal instrumentality im-
mune from state taxation, a firm seeking such status must show an
extraordinarily close relationship to the national government. The
ad hoc determination of whether a corporation is so assimilated
into the government so as to become a constituent part essentially
depends on two factors. First, the corporation should perform a
federal function. 100 Whether it is enough that the firm performs
this function in addition to achieving its own private goals has not
been addressed by the Supreme Court. Clallam County v. United
States,'0' the Michigan property cases '1 and Department of Em-
ployment v. United States1 0 3 indicate that the corporation should
not obtain a private advantage or gain from the performance of its
services for the federal government. However, despite having many
of the characteristics of a private business, land and national
banks have been held to be federal instrumentalities because they
indirectly performed a federal function.
A second factor considered by courts in determining whether a
private entity is a federal instrumentality for purposes of state tax-
ation is the amount and form of financial assistance the corpora-
tion receives from the federal government. For example, in Clallam
the federal government owned almost all the corporation's stock
and in Department of Employment, the Red Cross received sub-
stantial federal aid. It has not yet been determined, however,
whether close financial ties alone will be sufficient to grant federal
immunity status.10 4
IV. Federal Loan and Equity Finance Programs
It is clear that the availability of capital is a critical factor in a
nation's economic development. Over the past decade, however,
smaller firms have felt the effect of a shrinking capital supply. 0 5
because in Sloan, unlike in McClellan, Congress in establishing the corporation, had "con-
templated a corporation in which private persons might be stockholders." 258 U.S. at 565.
100. See note 80 supra.
101. 263 U.S. 345 (1923).
102. See United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958); United States v. Muskegon, 355
U.S. 484 (1958); United States v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
103. 385 U.S. 355 (1966).
104. See notes 111-37 infra.
105. PUBLIC OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES UNDERWRITTEN FOR COMPANIES WITH NET WORTHS
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Although in recent years the situation has improved,10 6 there is
still a need to correct the market imperfections which funnel capi-
tal away from areas where it is most needed, namely smaller firms
with the potential to employ socially and economically disadvan-
taged citizens.107
If the government chooses to intervene in the market to influ-
ence the allocation and pricing of capital it has three alterna-
tives.10 8  First, it can regulate existing private financial in-
termediaries. 109 Second, it can attempt to correct existing market
disadvantages by offering small firms economic incentives to start
and continue production. 1 0 Third, the government can establish
OF $5 MILLION OR LESS, 1969-1975









Small Business Administration, Report of the SBA Task Force on Venture and Equity
Capital 13 (Small Business Administration 1977). Reprinted in H. HOVEY, DEVELOPMENT
FINANCING FOR DISTRESSED AREAS 18 (Northeast-Midwest Inst. June 1979) [hereinafter cited
as DEVELOPMENT FINANCING].
106. Buckley & Richert, Venture Capital is Plentiful Once More, Partly Due to Change
in Capital-Gains Tax, Wall St. J., June 14, 1979, at 42, col. 1.
107. The Small Business Administration ("SBA") has suggested several reasons why
small businesses have an insufficient capital supply: 1) concentration of assets in institutions
preferring larger investments; 2) investor movement out of equities generally; 3) high entry
costs for a registered offering; 4) venture capital organizations financing large companies
rather than new ventures; and 5) greater role of large banks at expense of small firms. DE-
VELOPMENT FINANCING, supra note 105, at 19.
108. See L. LrTVAK & B. DANIELS, INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 2 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as INNOVATIONS IN DEvELO.PMNT FINANCE].
109. An example would be the development of rules governing asset holdings of govern-
ment chartered institutions. See INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 108.
110. For example, a state may give tax abatements to small firms to facilitate their
growth. See, e.g. N.Y. COM. LAW §§ 115-120 (McKinney Supp. 1977) (Urban Job Incentive
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its own financial intermediaries to circumvent a market which does
not maximize social utility.
The federal government created its own financial intermediary
in the Small Business Administration ("SBA").111 The function of
the SBA is to provide, through the use of small business invest-
ment companies ("SBIC's") and minority enterprise small business
investment companies ("MESBIC's"), long-term credit and equity
capital'to businesses whose full participation in the free enterprise
system has been hindered by social or economic disadvantages."'
Congress empowered the SBA to purchase or guarantee debentures
issued by small businesses""8 and, in addition, Congress has em-
powed the SBA to purchase shares of non-voting preferred and cu-
mulative stock.1 14 Equity financing of this kind is a boon to capi-
tal-starved firms. ,15
There has been increasing pressure on Congress in recent years
to expand the use of this relatively new financial tool."" Although
Board).
111. Small Business Investment Act Amendments of 1972, 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1976).
112. H.R. REP. No. 1428, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 683(c) (1976). The term of the debentures must not exceed fifteen years.
Where the combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus is less than $500,000, the
amount of debentures purchased by the government must not exceed 200% of the corpora-
tion's combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus, less the amount of preferred
stock purchased by the government. Where the combined private paid-in capital and paid-
in surplus is more than $500,000, then the amount of debentures purchased may not exceed
300% of the corporation's combined private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus, less the
amount of such preferred securities. Id.
114. The amount of purchased stock may not exceed the combined private paid-in capi-
tal and paid-in surplus. Id.
115. Equity financing provides the small business with needed capital and gives the gov-
ernment a share of the businesses' future income, albeit uncertain. In this way, recipient
firms are able to employ their capital without degenerative debt-maintenence costs until the
business begins producing income. See INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCING, supra note
108, at 5-6.
116. For example, a number of bills introduced in the 96th Congress included equity
financing provisions. For instance, in the Leahy Rural Development Bank Legislation S.
372, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. S1606 (Feb. 20, 1980), included a provision for
joint venture equity co-sponsorship which would make available equity capital for rural
businesses and economic development projects. The Addabbo Minority Bank Legislation,
H.R. 6904, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H2190 (Mar. 25, 1980), sought to establish
an annual $500 million program authorizing the Small Business Administration to buy non-
voting stock in small, minority-operated businesses, with strong growth potential, located in
areas where there is surplus labor or underemployment. In addition, it has been urged that
an equity financing provision be included in legislation to establish a National Development
Bank. H.R. 7902, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. H6946 (July 31, 1980). The bill would
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the SBA presently operates one of the few federal equity finance
programs, a handful of states have also recognized the need for
such assistance. 117 The proposed and existing loan and equity
finance programs present a delicate constitutional issue in the ap-
plication of the federal immunity doctrine to private entities re-
ceiving such assistance. Although various tests have been formu-
lated by federal courts to ascertain whether a private entity is also
a federal instrumentality,' at base, it must be determined
have enabled the bank to make and guarantee long-term loans at reasonable interest rates
in order to achieve a full employment economy. These bills all lapsed with the close of the
96th Congress.
117. The first state equity program was the Connecticut Product Development Corpora-
tion ("CPDC"). CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-32 (West Supp. 1980). The CPDC was estab-
lished as a quasi-public corporation, in an effort to trigger sectorial growth in Connecticut's
economy. The CPDC invests in technologically intensive projects of a corporation rather
than the firm as a whole. Id. § 32-39. CPDC funding is limited to 60% of product develop-
ment costs to ensure that private funds are leveraged and that the state does not actually
manage the enterprise. The constitutionality of the CPDC was upheld in Wilson v. Connect-
icut Product Corp., 167 Conn. 111, 355 A.2d 72 (1974). The Massachusetts Technology De-
velopment Corporation ("MTDC"), MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 40G, §§ 1-10 (Michie Supp. 1981),
also seeks to invest in business using a significant amount of technology. The MTDC's ini-
tial investment limit is $500,000 and its lifetime investment limit is $1,000,000. Massachu-
setts has also established the Massachusetts Community Development Finance Corporation
(CDFC), MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 40F, §§ 1-5 (Michie Supp. 1981), which seeks to provide
equity capital to businesses in targeted economically depressed areas. The CDFC may not
own more than 49% of the voting stock in any small business. Id. § 5. The CDFC was held
to be constitutional by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Opinion of the Jus-
tices to the Governor, 373 Mass. 904, 369 N.E.2d 447 (1977). In an effort to develop it's
renewable resources so as to strengthen the self-sustaining sectors of the state economy,
Alaska established the Alaska Renewable Resources Corporation ("ARRC"). ALASKA STAT.
tit. 37, ch. 12 (1978). The ARRC may not invest in more than 49% of the outstanding
corporate stock of any individual corporation unless the legislature has approved the invest-
ment by resolution. The ARRC may invest no more than five percent of its capital or $1.5
million, whichever is less, in a single project. Id. § 37.12.080. The ARRC is also specifically
prohibited from assuming responsibility for management of any project in which it has in-
vested and may not exercise voting rights for that purpose. Id.
118. See United States v. Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson,
316 U.S. 481 (1942); Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341 (1923). See also notes
100-04 supra and accompanying text. Although the question has not yet been raised, the
Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee program, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1875 (Supp. 1980),
presents an interesting constitutional issue in light of the federal instrumentality doctrine.
The Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Board (the Board) pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1867
(Supp. 1980), may extend loan guarantees to the Chrysler Corporation (the Corporation) in
an amount not to exceed $1,500,000,000. The Board is authorized to inspect and copy all
accounts, books, records, memoranda, correspondence, and other documents and transac-
tions of the Corporation. 15 U.S.C. § 1869(a) (Supp. 1980). The General Accounting Office
has the authority to conduct audits of all accounts and books of the Corporation. 15 U.S.C.
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whether or not the private corporation is so closely related to the
federal government as to be immune from state taxation. Is the
infusion of federal capital either in the form of loans or equity suf-
ficient government-private sector interaction to shroud the private
corporation in the protective veil of the immunity doctrine? No
federal court has expressly decided whether a private corporation,
operating for its own profit while simultaneously fulfilling a federal
function, may be considered a federal instrumentality. Analogous
cases indicate, however, that a close relationship between the gov-
ernment and the private entity will be required before the doctrine
will be applied.11
A close relationship between the government and the private en-
tity has been found where, as in Clallam County v. United
§ 1869(b) (Supp. 1980). In addition, the Board is empowered to investigate allegations of
fraud, incompetence or irregularity in the management of the affairs of the Corporation
which are material to the Corporation's ability to repay the loans guaranteed. 15 U.S.C. §
1869(c) (Supp. 1980).
As a condition to the loan guarantees, the federal government requires certain corporate
actions. For instance, the Corporation is required to divest itself of $300,000,000 in assets.
15 U.S.C. § 1863(c)(3) (Supp. 1980). The Corporation as a pre-condition to receiving the
guarantees is required to modify collective bargaining agreements between the Corporation
and its employees as well as obtain concessions from employees not represented by a union.
15 U.S.C. § 1865 (Supp. 1980). It is interesting to note that the federal government was able
to have the president of the UAW, Douglas Fraser, appointed to the board of directors of
Chrysler. Although the federal government has not taken an actual equity interest in
Chrysler, the actions which the Board can require of Chrysler make the involvement and
stake of the federal government in the corporation apparent. See 15 U.S.C. § 1870 (Supp.
1980) enumerating the actions which the Board may take to protect the federal govern-
ment's interest in Chrysler, 15 U.S.C. § 1873(a),(b) (Supp. 1980), requiring the Board to
make semi-annual reports to Congress on its activities and on the long-term economic impli-
cations of the Chrysler loan guarantee program; 15 U.S.C. § 1873(c) (Supp. 1980), requiring
the Secretary of Transportation to complete an assessment of the economic impact on the
automobile industry of federal regulatory requirements upon request of the Board. The abil-
ity of the federal government to place an individual on Chrysler's board of directors, to
inspect and audit the books and accounts of the corporation, see Ochs v. Washington
Heights Fed. S&L Ass'n, 17 N.Y.2d 82, 215 N.E.2d 485, 268 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1966) (recogniz-
ing a shareholder's common-law rights to inspect corporate records), and to order divesture
of corporate assets are all indicia of control. See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155
N.E. 58 (1926); Wormser, The Genius of Common Law: Enemies at the Gate, 12 COLUM. L.
REV. 496 (1912). Given the substantial monetary stake and the almost symbiotic relation-
ship between Chrysler and the federal government, Chrysler may be considered an instru-
mentality of the federal government at some point in the future. See Department of Em-
ployment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355 (1966); United States v. New Mexico, 624 F.2d 111
(10th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-702).
119. See notes 100-04 supra.
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States,120 the United States owned almost all of the corporate se-
curities 121 and the firm was established and operated solely to per-
form a federal function. In Clal1am County, the federal function
consisted of building airplanes for the government during World
War I and the firm performed no function of its own. Indeed, the
Court explicitly distinguished Cla11am County from the case of a
corporation existing for its own purposes as well as those of the
government. 122
The federal function2 " which the SBA performs is to contribute
to a well-balanced national economy by facilitating ownership in
small businesses by those who have been hampered because of so-
cial or economic disadvantages.124 Certain state programs are also
specifically targeted to substandard or blighted areas.125 It is argu-
able that if the SBA were to target its loan and equity financing
exclusively to economically depressed areas, recipient corporations
would directly effectuate the goals of the SBA, thereby performing
a federal function. On the other hand, if the SBA were to make its
loan and equity financing programs widely available, it would be
difficult for any one recipient corporation to argue that it performs
a federal function.
Another factor considered by the Clallam Court in determining
the closeness of the relationship between the corporation and the
government was the fact that the United States owned almost all
of the corporation's common shares. In equity financing programs
where the government, qua stockholder, is an owner of the corpo-
ration sharing in both the gains and loses of the business, these
ties are most pronounced. In order to gain the status of a federal
instrumentality, however, the government would have to own a sig-
nificant amount of the firm's shares. If the government was enti-
120. 263 U.S. 341 (1923).
121. Id. at 343.
122. Id. at 345.
123. Compare Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 102
(1941) ("[wlhen Congress constitutionally creates a corporation through which the federal
government lawfully acts, the. activities of such a corporation are governmental") with
NRLB v. Bank of America, 130 F.2d at 627 (a national bank was not an instrumentality
because Congress did not create the bank but merely enabled it to be created). See note 80
supra.
124. H.R. REP. No. 1428, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
125. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40F §§ 1-5 (Michie Supp. 1981).
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tied to voting rights,126 its influence in the corporation would be
even greater. 12 7
Although generally there are limits to the amount of loan and
equity capital the federal government may invest in private corpo-
rations which are tied to the amount of paid-in capital,12' it is ar-
guable that a firm which receives the maximum investment should
be considered a federal instrumentality because of the corpora-
tion's close relation with the government and its performance of a
federal function.1 29 Thus, a firm which receives a relatively small
amount of federal financing may still have a close connection with
the federal government where the overall private paid-in capital is
also small.3 0
As the Court stated in Department of Employment v. United
States, there is "no simple test" to determine when a private en-
tity is so close to the government as to become an instrumental-
ity." Yet it is evident that a private entity must first overcome
arduous judicial barriers before the Supreme Court will deem it a
federal instrumentality. Corporations participating in loan or equi-
ty finance programs do maintain a close relationship with their
creditor or stockholder, the government.1 3 2 In light of Clallam,3 8
126. The SBA may only purchase shares of non voting stock. 15 U.S.C. § 683(c)(1)
(1976).
127. In addition to capital, participants in loan or equity financing programs may also
receive technical assistance from the government. For instance, a bill proposing the estab-
lishment of a National Development Bank, states that "[t]he Bank may provide to borrow-
ers whatever assistance, technical or otherwise, it considers necessary to protect its invest-
ment and to carry out the purpose of this Act." H.R. 7902, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 16(1)
(1980). The influence of the Bank in the affairs of the recipient corporation is illustrated by
the loan conditions that: 1) borrowers agree to fill a specified number of job openings to be
determined by the Bank with previously unemployed or underemployed people; and 2) bor-
rowers agree to conduct training sessions for such people. Id. § 14.
128. See notes 113-14 supra.
129. See Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. at 359-60 (test for fed-
eral instrumentality whether entity is an "arm of the government"); United States v. Mus-
kegon, 355 U.S. at 486 (in determining whether entity was a federal instrumentality court
asked whether corporation was "so assimilated by the Government as to become one of its
constituent parts?"); Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. at 485 (test whether firm is an
"integral part" of a government department). An entity participating in an SBA equity pro-
gram may be able to satisfy the above criteria.
130. See notes 113-14 supra.
131. 385 U.S. at 358.
132. See generally 13 C.F.R. §§ 101-31 (1980) (getting out the many regulations private
entities must comply with to receive S.B.A. funds).
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Muskegon'34 and Department of Employment,3 5 however, the
mere assertion that participation in a federal finance program
would trigger the operation of the immunity doctrine is doubtful.
The modern trend has been toward a restrictive view of the federal
immunity doctrine.' Even in cases where the doctrine has been
applied to private corporations, the facts indicate a uniquely close
government-corporate relationship.'
V. The Role of Congress
Congress has the power to grant immunity from state taxes and
has done so in Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co.' 38 where the Court
held the Atomic Energy Commission immune by virtue of a con-
gressional statute.'8 9 In Cleveland v. United States,"0 the Court
stated that congressional power to grant immunities as deemed
necessary "is settled by such an array of authority that citation
would seem unnecessary.""' Moreover, a congressional waiver of
immunity must be clear, express and affirmative and will be
strictly construed.12
There is a need for a clear congressional statement" 3 in this area
133. 355 U.S. 481 (1958).
134. 263 U.S. 341 (1923).
135. 385 U.S. 355 (1966).
136. See generally The Waning of Tax Immunities, supra note 5; The Remnant of Tax
Immunities, supra note 5.
137. National and land banks, which possess characteristics of private businesses have
been held to be a federal instrumentality immune from state taxation because of the func-
tion they perform. The granting of this status has been criticized because of the changed
roles of modern national banks. See First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392
U.S. 339 (1968); NRLB v. Bank of America, 130 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318
U.S. 791 (1943); Liberty Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Buscaglia, 21 N.Y.2d 357, 235 N.E.2d
101, 288 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1967). The Supreme Court decisions, however, which have granted
immunity to national and land banks are precedent for a determination that firms receiving
equity capital from the United States government who also perform an important federal
function may also be immune from state taxation.
138. 342 U.S. 232 (1952).
139. Id. at 236.
140. 323 U.S. 329 (1945).
141. Id. at 333.
142. United States v. City of Adair, 539 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1121 (1977). See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, § 6-28 at 391 ("In those rare cases where Congress
has expressly granted or withheld regulatory or tax immunity to certain of its instrumentali-
ties, agents, or contractors, the validity or invalidity of state action is definitively settled by
such federal legislation.").
143. The rationale for limiting judicial interference in the operation of other branches of
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because of the rigid and restrictive tests applied by the Supreme
Court to determine when a corporate entity will be considered a
federal instrumentality for tax immunity purposes. The tests indi-
cated a desire by the Supreme Court to restrict the application of
the federal immunity doctrine. The decision of whether to restrict
this doctrine, however, has wide-ranging economic and political
ramifications. Because Congress is representative of both national
and state interests, it is best able to balance the competing policy
interests involved.1 44
In fact, as far back as McCulloch v. Maryland,14 the judiciary
itself recognized its own limitations in this field. The Court in Mc-
Culloch stated, "[w]e are not driven to the perplexing inquiry, so
unfit for the Judicial department, what degree of taxation is the
legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the abuse of the
power."'146 In Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co.,"47 the Court
stated that "the question whether immunity shall be extended...
is essentially legislative in character."" 48 Precisely on point is the
statement from the majority opinion in United States v. Detroit 49
expanding upon the idea enunciated in McCulloch: "[w]ise and
flexible adjustment of inter-governmental tax immunity calls for
political and economic considerations of the greatest difficulty and
delicacy. Such complex problems are ones which Congress is best
qualified to resolve."' 50
While the federal government wishes to perform and carry on its
government is that courts would be required to make decisions on matters over which they
have no particular competence and would thereby impede orderly conduct of government
affairs. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d
1062 (7th Cir. 1976), modified, 548 F.2d 715 (1977).
144. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, §§ 6-30, 31 at 399-404. But see United States v. New
Mexico, 624 F.2d at 116 n.5 (10th Cir. 1980).
145. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See also notes 6, 23 supra and accompanying text.
146. Id. at 430.
147. 336 U.S. 342 (1949).
148. Id. at 365-66. The Court also stated that "[t]he burdens of the taxes ... are. . . to
be judged by 'regard . . . to substance and direct effects (not) . . . by merely theoretical
conceptions of interference with the functions of government.' " Id. at 363.
149. 355 U.S. 466 (1958). See also note 64 supra and accompanying text.
150. Id. at 474. In another of the Michigan property cases, Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355
U.S. 489, 510 (1958), the Court stated again that Congress is the proper agency to determine
whether and to what extent private parties who do business with the government should be
given immunity from state taxes. See also Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. at 127
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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functions and activities free from state interference, states seek
much needed revenue from a traditional source-taxation of pri-
vate corporations. For the most part, judicial standards have been
inadequate, because their rigid formulistic approach is correctly
devoid of political consideration. It is critical that Congress, espe-
cially in the, emerging loan and equity finance programs, confront
these difficult issues as it alone is best suited to do.
James W. Smith
